Bentley - Forbes Rankings

Ranking the English Cricket Counties by Financial Strength

This post is a financial review of 17 of the 18 teams who compete in the English County Championship. I do this review every year, last year’s is here and the first rankings were collated in 2018.

As it’s a long post, a quick signpost. I’ll start with the table itself. Then a year in review section followed by a quick note on each of the 17 counties. Finally for the very interested a note on sources and methodology.

OK: sound the trumpets and prepare for a table:

So, Derbyshire are the sixth most profitable of the 17 counties. But for balance sheet strength they rank #1. That gives them an average ranking of 3.5 and they just pip Surrey to be top of the overall table.

The year in review:

The above figures are for the 2023 year end (or 31 January 2024 in a couple of cases). It was a year of extremes, Surrey had a before adjustments profit for the year of just over £8m, the highest profit for any county since I started these reports and I strongly suspect the highest profit any county has ever made. Yorkshire by contrast made a before adjustments loss of just over £7m, the biggest loss since I began to collate the figures and probably the highest loss made by any county ever.

Surrey and Yorkshire are, in their very different ways, exceptional counties and if we exclude Surrey’s profit and Yorkshire’s loss from the overall figures then the aggregate result for the other 15 counties was a loss of just shy of £0.5m. Many of the middling counties are being squeezed by a constant level of ECB funding up to the end of the current Sky deal on 31 January 2025 and increasing costs . Most counties have kept a pretty good handle on player’s salaries and executive remuneration but costs such as interest payable on debt and electricity etc. have been beyond their control.

When I first did this analysis in 2016 the bottom 5 counties all had Test match grounds: Lancashire (17), Warwickshire (16), Yorkshire (15), Durham (13=), Glamorgan (13=). By 2023 those rankings had changed as shown in the above table to, Lancashire (6), Warwickshire (10) Yorkshire (17), Durham (4) and Glamorgan (13). So, we have seen a consistent rise in the fortunes of the Test grounds and a corresponding worsening of the position of the non - Test grounds. Why have the Test ground’s position improved? There are a number of factors.

There has been some self - help, Lancashire in particular came out badly in the early rankings because they were redeveloping Old Trafford. Now the profits from the redevelopment are being realised and they have refinanced the associated debt their position has improved.

Yorkshire, Warwickshire and Glamorgan have all benefitted from their respective councils variously extending repayment terms on loans (Warwickshire), writing loans off (Yorkshire and Glamorgan) and receiving additional grants (Glamorgan.)

But most importantly the ECB has in recent years favoured the Test match grounds. Durham benefitted from a very public and humiliating ECB bail out which saw them give up Test match status. Glamorgan had a very similar bail out but of the old school port and cigars kind. All of the Test match grounds (I think) now benefit from ECB payments in years that they don’t stage a Test. The Hundred benefits the hosting counties who not only receive the £1.3m Hundred supplement but also get a hosting fee and a share of ticket revenues. The decision by the ECB to gift 51% of the Hundred franchises to the host counties represents both a continuation and an acceleration of the ECB’s pre - eminent policy of diverting as much of the revenue as they can from international cricket to the 8 hosts of Hundred franchises.

The financial future of county cricket has always been a little murky but I’ve generally been quite positive about the prospects for all 17 counties surviving. Now the murk has been replaced by thick fog. Interestingly the written preamble to the Glamorgan and Middlesex accounts both include something along the lines of “Things are tough at the moment but we should get more ECB funding from the deal that starts on 1 February 2025.” I do have my doubts about this, if the ECB gives away the farm to the 8 Hundred hosts, (which include Glamorgan but not Durham) how can it increase payments to the counties given revenues from the new TV deal are expected to be fairly level with the old?

Perhaps more optimistic is that the ECB is expecting to raise a minimum £350m from the sale of a 49% stake in the Hundred franchises. That figure seems incredible to me, but let’s assume it is right. In that case the 11 non host counties would receive a cash payment of approximately £18m. It’s possible that could be enough of an endowment to put all of the non - hosts on a sustainable basis even if payments from the ECB under the post 31 January 2025 rights cycle are similar to amounts received previously. But we will have to wait and see if the £350m is actually received and the fog won’t begin to lift until the second half of 2025 at the earliest.

County by County Commentary

Derbyshire #1. Still top of the prestigious Bentley - Forbes Consulting rankings. Derbyshire’s financial success is based on cost control, the wage bill actually fell in the year to December 2023, allowing them to turn a profit, although down on the 2022 figure. One of only two counties not to bid for a professional women’s team. The problem with Derbyshire’s approach is it gives them a very low quality playing staff. Not only don’t they produce England players it’s rare a player from Derbyshire makes the step up to a better county. Sam Conners getting a contract with Durham and Harry Moore breaking into the England U19 team are maybe signs of improvement.

Surrey # 2. A financial juggernaut in English domestic cricket. Surrey paid more tax in the year to 31 January 2025 than any other county made in the equivalent accounting period. Surrey have quite a bit debt, associated with recent ground improvements but as and when that is paid off I would expect them to rise to the top of the table. Although Surrey and Derbyshire are totally different in terms of income and scale I think both can be criticised for not doing enough. Yes Surrey are financially successful and only Yorkshire match their record for producing England players, but Surrey’s youth development work is entirely dependent on private schools and players from South Asian backgrounds rarely make it into the first team. Surrey seem to be caught in a cycle of, “we make money, to invest in the ground, to make more money, that is, ultimately, sterile.

Nottinghamshire #3 A tough year for Notts who had to go without a Test match and watch, MCC, Surrey, Lancashire, Warwickshire and Yorkshire all benefit from an Ashes fixture. As a result Notts made a loss in the year but still have a strong balance sheet.

Northants #4 Not a members organisation after a group of members “bought - out” the county by injecting additional funds into a holding company. The amount raised in this way was £1m or so, not that large in relative terms, but it has provided some financial security.

Durham #5 Continue to work their way up the table. The ECB bail out may have been draconian but along with good management on Durham’s part it has provided financial stability to a county that previously operated on a wing and a prayer. At the same time the county has preserved its unique virtues and has a excellent record of bringing players through from state schools and good representation in England squads.

Lancashire # 6 A pretty good year although an adjusted profit of £2.1m might be slightly disappointing for an Ashes year when compared to £5m made in 2019. Lancashire continue to redevelop Old Trafford with the amount of debt increasing accordingly.

Sussex # 7 In all the years I’ve been doing this Sussex have never made a profit. But due to their of ownership of land at the sea end of the ground the balance sheet has always looked good. The redevelopment of the Tate Buildings was completed by the end of 2023 and much of the debt, that appeared on Sussex’s balance sheet in 2022, repaid. But there doesn’t seem to have been any associated profit or loss in conjunction with the residential units being sold, so I assume that all went to the joint venture partner. What Sussex have got from the redevelopment is a pub (which they had before anyway) and offices above the pub. Those investment properties are valued at £5m in the accounts but only the pub had been let out at the balance sheet date. If Sussex can find tenants for the offices it will be in a pretty solid position for a non Hundred hosting county.

Whilst the sea end of the ground was being redeveloped Sussex put a squeeze on cricket costs which fell from £3.4m in 2019 to £2.8m in 2021. But with the work completed cricket costs rose to £3.1m in 2023.

Kent # 8 Some signs of distress in 2023 with the county making a loss of almost £0.5m and net financial liabilities increasing. The chairman’s statement includes an unintended comic gem: “The Board have concluded that we must seriously consider becoming a county with a Hundred franchise.” Suggesting a disconnect from reality.

Somerset # 9 Continue to deftly balance cricket and financial requirements with total cricket costs basically flat compared with 2022. Made a profit in 2023 although down on previous years.

Warwickshire # 10 On the rise and as they are my county they always get a write up.

Essex # 11 A county that came second in the first ever Bentley - Forbes Consulting rankings but has fallen ever since. 2023 was a particularly worrying year with a loss of almost £0.7m. Some of this was down to the costs of investigating systemic use of racist language or conduct at the club between 2001 and 2010 but even without that there was a loss of almost £0.5m. One factor here is that Essex has continued to spend aggressively on players with £4.3m being spent on cricket operations compared to £3.9m in 2022.

One brighter aspect of the county’s financial state is that even having gone through a few hard years it retains a portfolio of investments , which is something many other smaller counties don’t have. Hopefully things will improve financially as Essex seem well run, with a decent crop of young players coming through.

Middlesex # 12 Was so badly run that it breached its County Partnership Agreement with the ECB. Things seem to be improving with the county making it’s first profit in four years in 2023. Interestingly a significant part of the total profit was a claim for an R&D tax credit of £77k. It is a requirement of expenditure eligible for an R&D credit that it is, “‘directly contributing’ to seeking the advance in science or technology.” What are Middlesex up to? Developing a vaccine? Or a virus? I think we need to be told.

Glamorgan # 13 A bad year for Glamorgan with a loss of £0.6m and an equivalent increase in net debt. The county has always been dependent on the kindness of friends of chief executive Hugh Morris, but Morris retired in 2023.

Leicestershire # 14 Although I get the impression that Leicestershire’s senior management are more switched on than many of their counterparts the county continues to struggle. At least part of their problem seems to be that playing expenses are increasing at quite a rapid rate. This might have something to do with the floor part of the cap and floor for county cricket salaries.

Worcestershire # 15 Another county that seems decently run but struggles financially and of course global warming and the ground flooding pretty much every winter and into the (too early) start to the season imposes additional demands. But did make a profit in 2023.

Gloucestershire # 16 Have been plummeting down the table in recent years and lost over £1m in 2023. Gloucestershire are a hybrid club not being a Test match ground but staging the odd one day international or T20I game. The 2023 ODI with Ireland only made a small profit. Interestingly county members voted out chairman David Jones in 2024, with the chief - executive departing soon after. It will be interesting to see if things improve under new management.

Yorkshire # 17. I actually have four different measures of financial strength, one for profit and three for balance sheet resilience, which then get combined into a single balance sheet measure. Yorkshire came bottom on all four measures and managed to sustain an adjusted loss of £2.8m in a year when it staged an Ashes Test. (Loss before adjustments of over £7m.) I’ve done a longer piece on Yorkshire’s 2023 accounts here.

Methodology and Sources

The sharp eyed will have noted that only 17 of the 18 teams competing in the county championship are included, the odd team out being Hampshire. Hampshire are a private company once owned by Rod Bransgrove and now the conglomerate GMR Group. Accordingly it isn’t really comparable with the other 17 counties and as the Hampshire accounts are quite complicated even my nerdy enthusiasm for cricket finances reached its limits. Arguably I could also have left out Durham and Northamptonshire which are governed by the Companies Act rather than member controlled, but in both cases I think there is some principal that the organisations aren’t just profit maximisers.

All figures are sourced from 2023 accounts except for Surrey and Gloucestershire where accounts for the year to 31 January 2024 have been used. For member owned counties accounts are available from the mutuals register and for Durham and Northants, Companies House. Using a common year - end for all of the counties means my results are consistent but can be a bit out of date as I have to wait until the last county has filed its results with the regulator, Essex seem to file late.

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My profit figures start with profit after tax and I will strip out any deferred tax in the tax line (provided I remember.) I also adjust for one - off non - cash items and there were quite a few of these in 2023. I deducted investment property revaluations for Surrey and Sussex (Surrey positive and Sussex negative), added back a decline in value of an interest rate swap in Lancashire’s accounts and the write down of Yorkshire’s fixed assets.

As there is some fluctuation of results from year to year (especially for counties with international fixtures) my final profit figure is an average of the previous 3 years.

The balance sheet part is a bit more complicated. Reports on county finances often disclose a debt figure which is generally money owed to banks and other lenders. I think this is a bit unsatisfactory, counties may owe money to non - lenders (HM Revenue and Customs for instance) but will also have fungible assets to hand, such as ECB grants due and cash at the bank. So I start by adding all of these items both creditors and debtors in. Then I make some adjustments…..

Firstly I exclude fixed assets such as stands, the logic being that although these are revenue producing they can’t be sold at short notice to generate cash. However, I leave in investment properties such as those owned by Sussex and Surrey. You could take issue with this, especially as I end up including Sussex’s offices and Surrey’s hotel in my figures but not Lancashire’s hotel.

Secondly I exclude grants to build stands etc. This is just an accounting thing, if I build a stand for £10 and get a grant for £3 the accounts include a fixed asset of £10 and a liability of £3. As I’m excluding the £10 I also need to exclude the £3.

More problematically I also exclude liabilities described as accrued income. Imagine a Test county receives £100 for a 2025 Test match in its 2024 accounting period. The £100 cash will be an asset in the balance sheet, the accounting convention is that it shouldn’t be recognised as income in the profit and loss statement until 2025. But double entry bookkeeping requires us to have another entry to balance the £100 of cash so we set up a creditor in the balance sheet for £100 of accrued income in the 2024 accounts. And in a way it is a creditor, by taking the customers money we owe them £100 of Test cricket in 2025. But in another way it isn’t a liability, there may be costs to staging the Test match but in general we would expect it to make a profit in 2025 even without including tickets sold in 2024, we might sell tickets in 2025, there will be food and drink revenues etc. So on balance I decided to deduct accrued income liabilities from my measure of balance sheet strength.

Having made all these adjustments I then have a nominal figure for adjusted assets / liabilities for each county and I use this as my first ranking measure, i.e. county with the biggest asset figure comes first, county with the biggest liabilities comes last. (most but not all of the counties are in an adjusted liability position.)

My second measure then takes the adjusted nominal asset / liability position and divides it by fixed assets to get a ratio. This acknowledges that although I exclude fixed assets from my nominal asset / liability calculation they do matter. A Test match county with net liabilities of £10m might be in decent shape if it has £20m of stands to generate revenue and pay back the money owing. A non - Test county with fixed assets of £5m is going to struggle. Again the ratios are ranked, with the largest positive ratio being the first ranked county and the lowest negative ratio being ranked 17th.

The third ratio is debt, unadjusted for assets, repayable in the next 5 years again divided by fixed assets to recognise Test match counties are better able to handle debt. The point of this ratio is that not all debt is created equal and debt falling due in the short to mid term is, generally, more problematic than long term debt. Rankings are for the smallest proportion of debt under 5 years to the largest.

I then aggregate the three debt measures and divide by three to get a balance sheet result for each county and again rank from 1:17. Why bother with three balance sheet measures? Well I wasn’t happy that any one debt measure really captured the true position. In fact counties generally have a similar performance across all three measures so it might have been overkill.

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